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"The enormous computer systems ... in our culture have, in a 
very real sense, no authors. Thus they do not admit of any 
questions of right or wrong, of justice, or of any theory with 
which one can agree or disagree." 
Joe Weizenbaum, 
Computer Power and Human Reason (1 976) 
p. 239. 
"Decision makers need a better understanding of the models, 
their assumptions, strengths, and limitations, and of why they 
produce the results they do." 
Martin Greenberger. 
"Closing the circuit between modelers and decision makers", 
EPRI Journal, 8 (1 977), 
pp. 6-13 
PREFACE 
This paper is a companion to Keepin's A O-itical Appraisal of the 
IIMA Energy Senarios (IIASA WP-83-104). Although i t  is intended to be 
self-contained it is better read in conjunction with that  paper. In pub- 
lishing it 1 want to acknowledge the many valuable conversations 1 have 
had with Bill Keepin. I also want to pay tribute to the  continual honesty 
and fairness of his purpose. and to his consistent attempt to be construc- 
tive in what is inevitably in many ways a critical task. My reasons for 
supp~ort ing this work are that i t  provides an important example of the 
reasons why more systematic attention to institutional contexts of policy 
analysis and policy making is necessary in analysis itself. 
I t  speaks something of the  quality of scientific debate at 1IASA tha t  i t  
should be able to integrate self-criticism into its research curriculum 
for developing methods and strategies in policy analysis. It has been said 
that the IIASA Energy Systems Project enjoyed vigorous debate and criti- 
cism in its normal mainstream fare, so that these contributions, offered 
as attempts to promote broader reflection, will take the  place in that 
healthy diet. 
The point about Keepin's critique, and of my analysis, is emphati- 
cally not that the particular biases of Energy in a F in i te  World (EIFW) are 
less legitimate than anyone else's, but that  the biases: (i) were deeper 
and indeed of a more subtle kind than recognized; (ii) went straight 
through the "analytical" process with little or none of the correction 
that analytical methods are supposed to apply; and (iii) were then 
obscured by rather extreme claims for the objective control of bias. 
My first reaction on hearing earlier versions of Keepin's critique 
were that  while it was mildly interesting to hear that some energy 
models did little or nothing, that  was not itself anything very new, and 
not worth a lot of effort to document and publicize. However, I was pro- 
voked into drafting a paper when I heard reactions to Keepin's criticisms 
and tested these against other statements. These initial responses were 
essentially patronizing remarks about a bright but naive young idealist's 
need for initiation into the "realities" of science. The reactions have 
been th.at he has rather pedantically demonstrated his own technical 
competence like a good graduate student by learning for himself what 
everybody in the field already knew. If he would now learn the proper 
protocols of self-expression, the cryptic professional languages which 
maintain external credibility by muting what would otherwise be explicit, 
externally visible internal. frankness and self-criticism, he would be 
admitted with honor into the community of analysts. Interestingly, this 
attempt to initiate the innocent uses the picture of scientific practice as 
messy, informal, and contingent (not governed by preordained rules of 
method, etc.), which social empirical analysis of science has contrasted 
with previous normative images of good practice. The unruly pragmatic 
reality is being used as a normative framework in the defense of EIFW 
against Keepin, to show him how to be a "mature" analyst. He is 
effectively being told that if he measured his analysis of EIFW against a 
"realistic" view of science and analysis, his criticisms would dissolve. 
I tested these reactions in a very simple way - 1 looked in the litera- 
ture a t  what the  EIFW study said about its models, and what other 
experts believed. What I found, as is documented here, datly contradicts 
the blandishments directed at Keepin that everybody supposedly knew 
the models were trivial. The whole point, as developed in this paper, is 
that when Keepin examines iteration, sensitivity analysis, etc., he is 
measuring EIFW against its own c la ims  about i t s e l f ,  not against some 
abstract ideal that he himself introduced. I decided therefore that this 
was not only worth documenting in itself, but also worth trying to inter- 
pret and put in broader, more constructive perspective. 
In addition to the collaboration with Bill Keepin achowledged above 
I am also grateful to Erno Zalai, Mike Thompson, Dick Bocking, Man 
McDonald, Holger Rogner, Jesse Ausubel, Tim O'Riordan, Gordon Goodman 
and Val Jones for comments and conversations on this topic. Needless to 
say, none of them is a t  all responsible for the errors of assertion, judge- 
ment, or expression left in this paper. 
This paper is offered as a contribution to general methodological 
reflection within applied systems analysis. It is about several linked 
questions: (i) the nature of intrinsic structural bias in the very activity 
of formal modeling; (ii) the pitfalls involved in attempting to be objective 
by artificially abstracting physical and technical aspects of an issue from 
institutional dimensions; (iii) the underlying structural correspondence 
between particular modes of policy analysis and of the policy process 
itsel; (iv) the problems of proper self-representation of policy analysis, 
given the inevitable conflation of informal judgement and formal calcula- 
tion involved; and (v) the ambiguous connections between the pragmatic 
role and practice of policy analysis, and the processes of quality control. 
The IIASA energy study happens to be a good example of several gen- 
eral problems and confusions that require further development of 
methodological reflection already under way. A major point of this paper 
is that the necessary acceptance of analysis as a craft skill, like conven- 
tional science (i.e., not completely specifiable in terms of its rules of 
inference, logic, etc.), must  not be allowed to justify 1a.issez-faire with 
respect to standards of proper practice in such basic matters as docu- 
mentation and sensitivity analysis. Although the IIASA ESP suffered prob- 
lems in these respects and over demarcating the boundaries between 
formal and informal modes of analysis, i t  is by no means unique, as this 
paper shows.* The overall conclusion is that if it is to be meaningful. 
methodological reflection and change within applied systems analysis 
requires corresponding systematic attention to the policy process and 
institutional contexts in which analysis and decision making are con- 
ducted. In an  important sense, analysis is a symptom of a given policy 
process, rather than an input to  it. 
* A recent important paper has come to my attention unfortunately too late to assimilate and 
discuss here. This appears to contain striking similarities (even to the extent of its in- 
dependently formulated titJe) but some significmt differences of approach to my own 
presented here: (The Energy Model Muddle, P. Brett Hammond, Pblicy Sciences, 16 (1984) 
227-243. 
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HODEXS, MUDDLES AND MEGAPOLICIES: 
THE W A  ENERGY Sl'UM AS AN 
EXAMPU OF SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
Brian Wynne 
In the Usborne Book of 3 b n c e  F'un for children [I], some elemen- 
tary strictures are given on "Being a Scientist": 
"When you build a model, or do an experiment, you need to be 
careful and accurate, as a real scientist would be. On these 
pages there are some hints on being a scientist. If you follow 
these, your projects should be successful, though even real 
scientists sometimes have to  repeat experiments because they 
do not work first time." 
We are all grown up enough to know that "being a scientist" is not like 
this kindergarten ideal. We soon learn that the world is not made up of 
the artificial entities we create, such as perfect harmonic oscillators, or 
perfectly elastic solids, or even definitively repeatable experiments [2]. 
So tbo with respect to  the process of scientific practice, and models of its 
governance by righteous principles of full communal knowledge; univer- 
sal access; uniform evaluative standards; (disinterestedness), and organ- 
ized skepticism towards untested claims. These have given way to more 
complex and ambivalent accounts [3], and science for policy departs 
even further from such tidy norms. In policy reality there are no such 
things as controlled experiments, ideal markets, definitive resource 
bases or general solutions. Even "the economy" does not exist as an 
objective entity. Like all other entities around which we construct poli- 
cies, it  is "an extremely high-order intellectual construct ... I t  is, like 
the unicorn, a myth - an extraordinarily useful myth nevertheless" [4]. 
Just as the objects about which science has attempted to create useful 
knowledge have become more complex, so too have the realities and our 
perceptions of the social processes of analysis that create that 
knowledge. 
From the earliest days of systems analysis and of its precursor, 
operations research (OR), there has been endless discussion of its status 
in relation to 'true' science. The tacit anxiety underlying this soul- 
searching has justifiably been about the professional status of the field 
and the public authority of the knowledge it  has produced. Inevitably 
recognizing that  it  must claim to exercise authority in issues beyond 
conventional ideas of scientific logic or method, applied systems analysis 
(ASA) has acknowledged the extra, judgemental or "craft" dimensions of 
its trade [5]. This has become increasingly significant as the field has 
evolved: originally from relatively narrow OR applications mainly involv- 
ing quasi-scientific prediction and forecasting (of, e.g., the effectiveness 
of a given military operations solution); later moving toward prescrip- 
tive comparison of alternative policy options (e.g., within the cost- 
benefit analysis framework, often for a specific decision maker); and 
finally in the 1970s to policy analysis in the large, involving conflicting 
analyses in adversarial settings, often focusing upon institutional and 
procedural constraints and possibilities, and dealing with problems for 
which no identifiable decision maker or decision making body exists. 
Yet, ironically, as scientific expertise and systematic "objective" 
analysis have become more frequently involved in policy, their credibil- 
ity and thus their ability to deliver policy authority have actually 
decreased. The rate of growth of this policy impotence has been rather 
dram'atic, giving rise to a sense of crisis in many policy circles, yet the 
dominant reaction has been to repeat (with even more elaboration than 
before) the attempt to purify the analytical part of policy from the value 
parts. This has been attempted in both institutional mechanisms such 
as science courts, or splitting risk estimation from risk evaluation in 
regulatory bodies [ 6 ] ,  and in epistemological principles. such as enforc- 
ing more formal precision and specification of rules of inference and 
decision in policy-related analysis [ 7 ] .  
As 'responses to diminishing credibility, these initiatives attempt to  
create and defend a realm of pure authority and substuntive as  well as 
procedural objectivity. In so doing they present the analytical domain as 
more intellectually coherent and objectively verified than it is in reality. 
In a previous paper I have discussed at a general level the false metaphy- 
sics of "purification" of science from social values [E]. In a forthcoming 
paper I will discuss the same theme more practically with respect to 
toxic chemicals risk assessment. 
The underlying point is to draw the connection between this "purifi- 
cation" myth and a central theme of Western social thought that  has 
recently come under long-overdue attack, and then to explore the practi- 
cal consequences for policy analysis and practice. The misleading theme 
is the individualistic metaphysics of human behavior and beliefs, which 
assumes that values are rooted in individual choice rather than sociocul- 
tural determination [9]. 
The complete entrenchment of this voluntaristic or individualistic 
metaphysics in social thought has recently been soundly criticized by 
Douglas [lo]. In the present context i t  is enough to point out how the 
perspective leads to the recurrent false belief that  values may "pollute" 
objective knowledge only through individuals with self-chosen biases. 
incompetences, etc. This presumes the absence of more basic and struc- 
tural, socially induced perceptions and definitions of reality that  may 
have come to be seen as natural and "objective" by a given culture or 
subculture, but which nevertheless reflect (unchosen in any real sense) 
human values [ll]. The dominant metaphysics and its associated idea of 
science misleads us into focusing attention on the control of individual, 
conscious bias as if this were enough to guarantee an objective, neutral 
analytical substratum of policy. This diverts our attention from the more 
complex collective giases underlying even honest attempts to maintain a 
clean division between science and politics. 
In this paper I will show how such fundamental confusions an$ 
simplistic ideas about the fact-value relationship in one major systems 
analysis project for policy, namely the IIASA Energy Systems Program 
(ESP). led i t  inexorably towards a deepening policy muddle rather than 
the factual clarification that was claimed. Except perhaps with respect 
to scale - it  has recently been described as "the most ambitious energy 
study so far" [12] - there is nothing uniquely delinquent about the IIASA 
ESP, so it  is to  be emphasized that this is an example of more general 
problems. However, the ESP is especially illuminating because: 
(i)  problems of self-representation have been exposed and 
accentuated by Keepin's technical critique of the quantitative 
analysis employed in the study, and the ESP group's reaction 
[131; 
(ii) these problems can be seen to  be linked to the process of 
policy analysis, notably arrangements for quality control and 
peer review of such complex projects; 
(iii) confusions in self-representation are related to and are 
essentially determined by confusions embedded in the very 
definition of the project, which was to separate the technical 
dimensions from the political, and thus to  conduct a supposedly 
neutral technical study. This approach would presumably dis- 
cover "the factual basis of the energy problem. that  is, to iden- 
tify the facts and conditions for any energy policy" [14], and "to 
provide decision- and policy-makers with the  information they 
need to  make strategic choices" [ E l m ,  p,BOO]; 
(iv) the problems of self-representation and questions of analyt- 
ical process are also accentuated by the fact that coinciding 
with the publication of its major output, h e r g y  in a Finite 
World (1981), a major campaign was launched to communicate 
its so-called "robust" conclusions to policy makers in all 
corners of the globe; 
(v) finally, as 1 will argue in the conclusions, all these issues 
considered together suggest the need to identify different 
styles of policy analysis, and to link these with corresponding 
kinds of policy process. The model of policy analysis 
represented by the IIASA ESP is one kind of analysis, implying 
only certain kinds of policy decision, and of (top-down, central- 
ized, capital-intensive, technology-dominated) institutional 
arrangements for policy ~liaking. This is one legitimate style, 
but there are others. From its metaphysics to premises, to 
methods, to conclusions, self-descriptions, and back to meta- 
physics, the IIASA ESP circulates within the same fundamental 
bias, encouraged by corresponding epistemological confusions 
and lack of institutional restraints within ASA generally. 
Therefore, using the IIASA ESP as an example, I will discuss some 
general issues in the development and uses of ASA as policy analysis. I 
will do this via an analysis of the framing and public self-representation 
of the ESP. Central to this aim will be an examination of the claims and 
perceptions about the role of computer models as a basis of authority for 
the policy "conclusions" that  the ESP claimed to reveal. 
Originally brought to IIASA to  try to simplify the ESP models, Keepin 
found that  indeed they could be virtually short-circuited altogether 
because their outputs were identical to subjectively determined inputs - 
there was no dynamic calculation at all. Worse still, when subjectpd to 
standard sensitivity analysis the models' outputs such as fuel mixes fluc- 
tuated wildly with tiny changes in assumptions. 
The responses to Keepin's earlier suggestions and presentations of 
these insights have naturally enough so far been in unpublished form - 
informal colloquia and meetings, correspondence, etc. However, their 
significance is so great that  they require examination alongside the pub- 
lished accounts of the IIASA energy study. 
A+main point of confusion is the centrality or otherwise of the 
models to the whole IIASA ESP. There was clearly a lot more value in the 
study than the part surrpunding the models. On the other hand, if ESP 
publications suggest, as they do, that  the models are significant in the 
study overall, the discovery that the models are severely limited will 
naturally undermine the credibility of all parts of the Program. If they 
have been oversold in the search for objective credibility, the unfor- 
tunate pay off is that valuable aspects of the program - perhaps more 
fragmentary and modest than comprehensive global claims but valuable 
nonetheless - m-ay be lost in the general misunderstanding of the real 
depehdence of the study's overall claims on its 'objective' models. 
The responses to Keepin's technical criticisms of the models as 
analytically vacuous and more or less completely constrained by exo- 
genous inputs created by subjective judgement will be examined and 
interpreted as problems arising mainly from the lack of any coherent 
and effective peer community for such modeling exercises. The point is 
not just that  discrepancies exist between actual analytical process and 
public self-description (this is a phenomenon that  is well recognized 
amongst social analysts of science, even in the most academic of 
sciences [15]); i t  is more that for the latter there are professional com- 
munities that share a tightly knit, self-regulating subculture and infor- 
mal mutual awareness. Thus, in principle, via their informal knowledge, 
they can control excessive discrepancies and exaggerated claims without 
external publicity and avoiding unrealistic demands for complete formal 
self-representation. In the case of ASA in policy analysis, no such subcul- 
tures exist, partly because ASA's defining claim to a rightful place is its 
trans-disciplinary nature, covering a wider range of questions thah a 
conventional scientific discipline. Thus there are three pressures: to 
produce more certain-looking knowledge for policy; to exercise more 
informal subjective judgements because of the broader coverage and the 
overcomplexity of ambitious models; and the lack of a coherent peer 
group. These combine to create even greater tensions and inconsisten- 
cies between formal languages and inaccessible, informal realities of 
analysis, to  the accumulating detriment of the policy process. 
I. 1 Analysis, Craft and Authority 
The evolving: self-image of ASA as craft activity (i.e., science plus 
intuitive judgement) was accompanied by growing recognition that  even 
natural science itself (let alone scientific statements for policy) is 
impregnated with unspecifiable, tacit judgements, in the evaluation of 
data, construction of experiments, recording of observations. defining 
"adequate" proof and disproof, and so on [16]. Indeed, it is this lack of 
pure formklism and of complete rule-specificity in scientific knowledge 
that underlies the ease with which, when subjected to unrealistic formal- 
ist standards (most notably legal cross-examination), scientific policy 
advice has been easily discredited in adversarial situations [I?], to the 
alarm of policy makers fed on an extravagant diet of misleading posi- 
tivist images of science. Even when conventional science makes inputs 
to policy, there are crucial and often tacit judgements entangled in the 
associated technical expressions. The judgements involve, for example, 
appropriate degrees of uncertainty to attach to variables and relation- 
ships; the framing of the problem and the selection or exclusion of dif- 
ferent aspects; and implicit conditions attached to the validity of 
expressed relationships. 
Given i ts  express claims to broader scope, yet with continuing 
claims to scientific foundations, i t  is hardly surprising that  ASA should 
encounter the same fundamental problems writ large. Adopting the 
status of craft as (supposedly) distinct from science does nothing in 
itself to:solve these problems unless some further issues to do with qual- 
ity control and self-representation are more seriously addressed, with 
more effect than hitherto [18]. As the policy role of ASA has evolved and 
broadened, from specific prediction through optimization to policy argu- 
mentation, its empirical referents have also become more elusive, so 
that it is no longer adequate or possible to evaluate analytical quality 
according to empirical tests and relatively solid feedback. (One response 
to this of course has been the growth of simulative modeling, as  dis- 
cussed in the next section.) As Majone and others have emphasized [19], 
policy analysis has become as much about justification and persuasion 
as about ,"discovery" of the  best policy [zo]. This distinction is compli- 
cated, though not contradicted, by the fact that a common means of per- 
suasion is to claim one is not persuading a t  all, but objdctively 
discovering [21]. 
There are few, if any, empirical referents with which many key pol- 
icy propositions may be unambiguously tested. Consequently, in order 
to evaluate the credibility of any policy analysis there is a need to spell 
lr 
odt the analytical procedures by which any claim to policy knowledge is 
reached. Thus Meltsner has argued that  "howledge about the analytical 
process is just as important as knowledge about policies if the effective- 
ness of public policy is to be improved" [22]. Greenberger, Schelling and 
others have drawn the same conclusions [23]. 
Yet as Archibald has established [24], the language of self- 
description of ASA is ambiguous and confused. In particular, i t  has often 
been unclear in central texts of systems analysis whether intuition and 
craft are to be seen as unfortunate, temporarily inevitable elements of 
ASA, awaiting their obliteration when formal analysis develops. or 
whether they will be forever essential to analysis. Much of the agonizing 
intellectual contortions involved in trying to provide a definitive answer 
aEpears to  be the result of a perceived need to  enjoy the public authority 
of formal rule-bound thought, accessibility and external testability, 
whilst recognizing that this could not credibly describe the real process 
of constructing policy advice. The fact that  intuitive processes may be 
necessary tp  scientific analysis can also be used illegitimately, as an 
excuse for not following the discipline of clear, accessible statements of 
assumptions and reasons as far as possible. 
Threading these debates and those specifically about models, there 
are the following basic questions: 
1. Is formalism superior to intuition? 
2. Is intuition or subjective judgement always part of formal 
analysis? 
3. Even if i t  is, should we merely tolerate and contain it, or 
champion i t  as a valuable part of the  exercise? 
4. If there is something more than fully specifiable, externally 
accessible analysis involved, is i t  "subjective judgement", which 
may be recognizable as such to its author, if not to others; or is 
i t  socially induced, non-empirical evaluation, which is cultur- 
ally specific and thus biased, yet so deeply ingrained as to  
appear to its bearers as objective and natural; or both? 
5. If such complex interactions of intuition and formalism do 
exist as is accepted in modern analysis of science [25], how 
then should we use science, and ASA, in policy? 
The last question is particularly acute because many of the  criti- 
cisms of specific policy analysis are about their self-description and 
interpretation into policy conclusions as much as about their substan- 
tive content 1261 and because a frequent lament from policy makers and 
analysts alike is the lack of rigorous at<-ntion to the ways in which 
analysis is "transferred to  the practical policy domain. 
12 The IIASA Ehergy Study 
The IIASA study of the global energy system began in 1973 and took 
7-8 years, approximately $10million, and 225 person-years of effort to 
complete. Its very scale dwarfs other efforts a t  energy policy analysis. I t  
has been widely taken as the most comprehensive such analysis ever, 
and has apparently achieved considerable impact. I t  has been widely 
described as the  most impressive, even unprecedented, and comprehen- 
sive study of 'the' global energy problem, "an unprecedented, detailed 
analysis ... analysing options in a quantitative, mathematical form" [27]. 
The idea that  i t  had discovered the 'objective' s tructure of the  global 
energy problem separating these from 'organizational' problems in "an 
elegant and coherent system solution to  a global problem," which had 
"changed our image of the  world and man's place in it," was observed by 
a US Congressman [27a]. and several recent major analyses of global 
energy and climate issues have adopted i t  as a definitive frame of refer- 
ence [27b], thus  tending prematurely to leave behind any questions over 
its origins and validity. 
The scale of the  project has also been linked to i t s  apparent objec- 
tivity. "More than 140 scientists participated in the study, including 
economists, physicists, engineers, geologists,  mathematician.^, psycholo- 
gists, a psychiatrist, and an  ethnologist. Thus it  is impossible for us to 
hold an extreme one-sided view'' [28]. An impressive network of interna- 
tional bodies collaborated in the project [29], and according to its Direc- 
tor, Wolf Hiifele, i t  has shaped energy policy discussions within several 
national and international government bodies [30]. 
One of t h e  benefits of such a long project of course, is that  there  is 
in principle t ime for many points of view to be heard and evaluated on 
many different aspects of global energy. The project in this sense was 
more than  i ts  final products, and  involved scientific publications on a 
range of issues from fusion, t o  logistic substitution curves, to  carbon 
dioxide output  projections, to  risk perception. But although some spe- 
cialist groups may have.focused upon specific scientific papers and sub- 
projects of special relevance to them, the  inain product for general 
evaluation remains the  book, l h e r g y  in a A n i t e  World, which in Hafele's 
own words "presents t h e  findings of t h e  study of the  global energy sys- 
tem," and "reflects our  work u p  to  this date [1979]" [EIFW, p . z i i i ] ,  and  
various related summary articles. Whatever may be the  complex reasons 
behind the  at tempted synthesis of a huge, multifaceted project into such  
a book, t he  project put  i ts name to  it, and publicized it vigorously and 
successfully. In this interpretation of t h e  IIASA ESP therefore, there is a 
clear warrant t o  take the  book a s  the  definitive self-description for policy 
and other  users. Nevertheless part  of my task will be to  outline the  
changes i'n th i s  self-description over t ime and space to  understand some 
inconsistencies and  misperceptions, inside and external t o  the  ESP. 
Although the main report, Bnergy in a Finite World, 1311 may be stu- 
died by relatively few experts, many others will be influenced by the  
more condensed interpretations of the  project and its definitions of "the" 
world energy problem in the  freely distributed R e c u t w e  Summary [32], 
and in such  widely read journals a s  Science,  3ient i f ic  American,  
M u r e s ,  and others  [33], n o t  to  mention the many unpublished summary 
briefings prepared for practical agencies and  bodies dealing with energy 
policies. In addition, Hafele alone has, in his own account, "given speech 
upon speech based on our 850-page book, h e r g y  in a finite World, in the 
last two years" [34]. 
The IIASA analysis combined mathematical modeling with scenario 
cohstruction and informal processes of judgment to analyze over a 50- 
year period the possible transition to what is taken to be a sustainable 
world energy system. The elements of sustainability were resource sup- 
ply, excluding environmental, price, technological, or social factors. The 
study involved "the design of a set of energy models that were subse- 
quently used for developing two scenarios - the principal tool of our 
quantitative analysis" [EIFW, p.riii] The scenarios were thus constructed 
with the aid of the models and were the heart of the  study, from which 
certain key policy conclusions were drawn.. 
The main conclusions of the study. as reported in h e r g y  in a Rnite 
World, and in the  summary articles, were that  a transition to  fast 
breeder nuclear reactors, centralized solar and coal synfuels must be 
made, and could be achieved beyond the year 2030, if the world acted 
decisively now, to accelerate the installation of the  necessary plants. 
These "robust" conclusions" have been forcefully publicized by Hafele 
[351. 
There have been strong criticisms of the substance of the conclu- 
sions and some central premises of the study [36], such as its lack of 
recognition of diverse, decentralized approaches to energy supply, or 
ways to reduce energy demand. There is also confusion and dispute as to 
the status of the models and their role in generating the scenarios and 
policy insights. Recently, there have been methodological and technical 
criticisms, notably by Keepin [37], that the models involved are analyti- 
cally empty; have had no real iteration or sensitivity analysis (despite 
claims to the contrary); and when so tested are extremely brittle to 
minor changes in important variables, contradicting the claims for 
"robust conclusions". 
These technical criticisms are more deeply significant than any 
arguments over substance. Firstly, they do not involve taking sides on 
the highly emotive policy options themselves; and secondly, they go 
beyond the question of inputs and their selection to ask how the models 
controlle'd such inputs and revised them. The whole point of formal 
modeling is that it  should correct inevitable biases in selection of inputs 
by repeatedly correcting them against specified and accepted criteria. 
Thus if this correction process does not work, none of the biases built 
into the inputs will be corrected by any externally accountable, clearly 
specified procedure. 
An immediate question a t  issue. therefore, is whether technical cri- 
ticisms of the modeling within the overall study are relevant to the ques- 
tion of the authority of the conclusions being drawn from it in "speech 
upon speech". It is into this murky water that the debate seems always 
to slide h.,enever argument is engaged about the technical validity of 
the modeling. For example, the repeated defence of EIFW against 
Keepin's technical criticisms of the modeling has been virtually total 
i ~cceptance,  but with the dismissive rejoinders (i) that everyone knew all 
along what Keepin claimed as a novel and central point, that the models' 
outputs were effectively a direct 1:l "transformation" of their inputs; and 
(ii) that  the models were anyway only a minor part of the analysis 
leading to the scenarios and conclusions [38]. Yet this assertion is con- 
tradicted by the study's own documentation and indeed by the response 
of other experts who have found Keepin's analysis surprising (at least in 
the extent of the limitations i t  reveals) and interesting [39]. By examin- 
ing descriptions of the models, their use in creating scenarios, and the 
conclusions drawn from these and associated analyses, 1 will try to place 
in perspective the role of the models. This task is made difficult by 
apparent inconsistencies, such as statements in one place that the 
scenarios "form a central. [part] of the comprehensive account of the 
group's activities ..." [EIFW, Vol 21 and "... were derived by using a linked 
set of models and procedures" [40], contrasted with assertions elsewhere 
that "the scenarios constitute only o n e  of several levels a t  which we 
analyzed the energy problem ... a partial exercise with numbers ... so 
much #emphasis on just the scenarios ... is therefore regrettable" [43.]. 
This examination should help to clarify the sources and kinds of author- 
ity underlying the IIASA ESP's policy conclusions. The substantive merits 
or demerits of those conclusions are of no relevance to this interpreta- 
tion. The role and representation of analysis in policy is the sole focus of 
our concern. 
II. THE R O L F  OF MODELS - WHAT' CAN WE EXPECT FAOM SCIENCE? 
11.1 Models,  A d  ysk, a n d  h t u i t i o n  
ASA, policy analysis and policy making (or a t  least its j u s t i f i c a t i o n )  
have come to rely to  a colossal extent upon complex mathematical 
models. This is despite the paradox occasioned by their broadened role 
in policy argument, that  they are used more and more, but believed less 
and less [42]. A t  first sight, the whole point about models is their formal- 
ism, which should allow mathematically rigorous consistency, discrimi- 
nation and testability to be achieved, to the benefit of policy. One large 
symposium on energy modeling was introduced by reference to such 
models as the policy response to the judicial call for greater accountabil- 
ity and explication of decision and inference rules in science for public 
policy [43]. A common (idealized) justification is that  
"formal models are first, testable, and second, documented, so 
that  assumptions are clear and you can examine the  data being 
used. Too often in energy policy matters the assumptions being 
made in a judgemental statement are neither obvious nor 
testable, also the data cannot be accessed ... judgemental 
models are models that are not open to scrutiny, their preju- 
dices are obscured" [44]. 
Unfortunately, however, formal models may also lead to the opposite 
effect, of obscuring prejudices even from their authors, in a labyrinth of 
apparently pure technical language. 
Indeed the science appeal of formal models has been so great that 
they have become pretty well a necessary badge of credibility in ASA. 
Modeling exercises have repeatedly claimed, implicity or explicitly, the 
authority of formal science. Thus for example one analyst berated his 
colleagues: 
"We have a list of quotations from Federal public officials 
including people in the Department of Energy, endorsing 
models as scientific apparati, ... 
The fact of the matter is that these models are presented as  the 
latest in scientific analysis, particularly to the public. Now the 
fact that  you and I know better ... doesn't alter the fact that 
they are presented that  way. The public believes it ,  ?Ae New 
York R m e s  believes it, m e  Atlantic Monthly believes it ,  ?'he New 
Yorker believes it, congressional staffs believe it, or some 
congressional staffs. The claim for these as science goes on 
repeatedly. especially when the heat is on" [45]. 
Nor is this a weakness only of public officials. According to another 
analyst, 
"model developers are usually aware of many model limitations 
or distortions that are never transmitted to other users" [46]. 
Thus even here the same confusions and conflicts have raged about the 
characterization of the analytical proces'ses involved and the status of 
the knowledge produced. This has been especially true in energy policy 
modeling, where some reputable critics have been so appalled as to call 
for a,moratorium on models [47]. 
A typical criticism was that produced by the Professional Audit 
Review Team of the Federal Energy Administration's (FEA) Project 
Independence Evaluation System (PIES) model in 1977: 
"The credibility of the OEIA's [Office of Energy lnformation 
Administration, later Energy Information Administration of the 
Department of Energy] models has not been established 
because documentation, verification. and validation have been 
neglected. "Furthermore publications describing the current 
models are scarce and procedures for public access to them 
almost non-existent. As as result i t  is practically impossible for 
interested parties outside FEA to know whether OEIA's current 
models have been constructed properly and used correctly and 
thus whether OEIA's analytical products and forecasts can be 
used with confidence" [48]. 
A later review saw some progress from this dismal state 1491, but many 
have recognized that  the rate of progress, i f  any, is far outstripped by 
the generation of further questionable models, and by developments in 
the real policy world that often render the founding premises of such 
models obsolete [50]. Indeed. the immensely cu.mbersome, costly, and 
lackluster efforts to subject such models to proper quality controls have 
been hampered by apathy towards such efforts by the modelers them- 
selves. Even where this has not engendered calls for a moratorium on 
models, it has stimulated a broad-based demand for critical model 
analysis to become a distinct institutionalized professional activity 
integral to model building and use in policy analysis [53.]. Goldman, for 
example, warned 'that if greater professional self-examination was not 
forthcoming from modelers themselves, it would only be imposed eventu- 
ally from outside. He also recognized the legitimate role of analysts' 
expefiienced intuition in the modeling process, but added the crucial 
condition, of truth in labeling the distinction to others: 
"it is simply not enough, in my opinion, merely to assess a 
model as a mechanical object without regard for what the 
modelers' insights and expertise can contribute to its perfor- 
mance ... the public and its representatives are (or should be) 
concerned for the quality of what flows from the entire model- 
use process. 
But please don't misunderstand me; I said that  such "deperson- 
alized" analyses were by themselves insufficient, not that  they 
were meaningless or (properly interpreted) misleading. In fact 
I think they are necessary for an understanding of what the 
model per se does, and whether (as my wine-fancying friends 
might say) it is likely to travel well. And there may be good rea- 
sons ... why a part of such analysis should even be performed a t  
a considerable remove from the modelers. 
I agree with those who find that  modeling today is still largely 
an ar t  form. ... Yet this element of artistry does not imply that 
no useful discussion of the product is possible. For instance, 
musical scholars and musicologists can and do undertake 
technical analyses and aesthetic evaluations of Chopin's etudes 
despite having no recording of Chopin playing them. Part of 
what composing is all about is the creation of musical works 
tha t  will continue to display beauty and give pleasure when per- 
formed by others, in different places and a t  different times. ... 
At any rate I continue to ascribe value to the traditional scien- 
tific criteria of reproducibility and portability, while ack- 
nowledging that  full-scale assessment must extend beyond 
these properties of the model to include the human elements o f  
the  modeling/analysis system. ... I t  seems more likely to me 
tha t  the analyst is bright, has built up a highly trained intuition 
in the course of working and playing with the model and its 
data, and should not be forbidden to contribute the benefits of 
that  informed though unformalized intuition to the cogitations 
of the decisionmaker. 
What is essential to maintain is t ruth in labeling. And so these 
"extracurricular" contributions need to be labeled explicitly as 
outputs of the modeler's intuition, not of the model itself. ... 
Now a more delicate point arises. If the witness giving tes- 
timony ... says in effect, like the principal in an E.F. Hutton 
commercial, "My model says --," when in fact the modeler 
operating in intuitive mode "said it" in the sense of a confession 
extorted in the police station's back room, with its inputs 
twisted and its logic "adjusted" to  produce a desired result -- if 
this is what's going on, does the modeler have a professional 
responsibility to  blow the whistle and try to set the  record 
straight? My own answer is I'yes" [52]". 
Gremberger has also added his weight to the cause of greater clarity in 
representation: 
"The typical policy model is not designed for ease of communi- 
cation with the decisionmaker. Even the model builder may 
have difficulty comprehending fully the essential workings of 
the Godel. Ideally, the model should be presented to the poli- 
cyrnaker, not as a "black box" with assumptions and data feed- 
ing into the left and results coming out from the right, but as 
an "open box" whose inner workings are sufficiently simplified, 
exposed, and elucidated to enable the policymaker to  trace the 
chain of causality from input to output on a t  least an elemen- 
tary and fundamental level. 
Models are rarely presented as open boxes. I t  would be a 
research project of considerable intellectual content and prac- 
tical significance to develop open box versions of selected 
models of greatest potential interest to policyrnakers" [53]. 
"... policy modeling must lend itself to testing and exploration 
by others than its developers. It must be possible to communi- 
cate the rationale of policy models as well as the results. 
lffa policy model cannot be tested, explored. and comprehended 
by persons not part of its development, one might expect its 
future to be brief and its use restricted. Yet, ... policy models 
have often been objects of blind reverence and admiration or 
equally blind awe and mistrust. They have been accepted or 
rejected because of the personal qualities and standing of the 
person presenting the  results--and because of the predisposi- 
tion of the person receiving the results--more than because of 
characteristics of the models themselves. And their role is' 
expanding" [54]. 
In summary, for all their apparently greater analytical sharpness, 
models still suffer the  same confusions as analysis generally, about the 
actual and proper role of intuition and judgement, and about the proper 
standards and methods of self-description and use. In the first aspect 
there are two problems; first. whether a model can ever be usable in pol- 
i c y  without additional, (but perhaps specifiable) intuitive judgements; 
and second, whether models can even be constructed and used technz- 
cal ly  without incorporating intuitive judgements and unrecognized 
assumptions. The appropriateness or otherwise of such judgemental 
intervention, and its proper quality control, depends on the forums that 
exist to  receive, evaluate and use such analyses, a point which returns 
us to the issue of institutional arrangements, and the process of policy 
analysis, including its communication to others. 
In a later  section I return to discuss models further, but next we 
examine the evolution from modeling to scenario construction in policy 
analysis. 
11.2 morn Models t o  3 e n a r i o s  
According t o  Greenberger [55]  the difference between science and 
policy analysis is that models in science produce testable propositions, 
whereas modeling in policy analysis is more pragmatic - "instruments 
for comparing alternative policy options". However, how does one com- 
pare alternative policy options without first producing propositions about 
the effects of each policy option? And should not these propositions be 
testable as far  as possible? A common reply is that comparative 
evaluation can be performed without too much dependence upon more 
fundamental, uncertain or unknown cause-effect processes, because 
"internal" comparison within the ring of alternatives is the central exer- 
cise. However, although this may be true of relatively confined decisions 
typical of early OR, i t  cannot be remotely claimed of most public policy 
issues like energy. Here, "comparing alternative policy options" has per- 
force to pretend to generate and evaluate different cause-effect proposi- 
tions: the policy options and the propositions themselves are embedded 
in very different fields of force that cannot be assumed to  form a com- 
mon background to  all the options. Whethet. modeling in policy analysis 
is so unlike scientific modeling is therefore still an open question. 
Indeed the testability of scientific modeling is also less direct and clear- 
cut than Greenberger suggests; both kinds may be more deeply imbed- 
ded in a complicated circularity of correspondence between different 
pieces of knowledge and presumption than is usually recognized. Within 
its circle of correspondence, science provides greater opportunity for 
empirical testing of its models than does policy analysis (but even scien- 
tific testing is never completely direct and is often highly indirect). Thus 
policy analytic models allow more room for the play of socially generated 
plausibilities. 
In any case, as the scope of policy-related models has broadened, so 
their credibility as a means of forecasting has diminished. The judge- 
ment of poets, writers and sages has been evaluated from the historical 
record to be a t  least as reliable as formal methods [56] .  Thus for large- 
issues like energy policy, the role of formal modeling has had to shift 
from direct forecasting to more modest functions such as simulatign, in 
an attempt to identify and test "key" policy relationships and variables, 
to determine the sensitive policy factors, the elasticity of "constraints", 
etc. Often this "testing" has little or no database, and relies upon syn- 
thetic data (which in turn often rely upon untested assumptions) or 
other theories with which results should correspond. Unwarranted credi- 
bility has then often arisen because of the lack of awareness of the non- 
empirical reference points surrounding the whole exercise [57 ] .  
One approach that tries to  overcome the forecasting problem is 
scenario construction. Scenarios are not forecasts but thought- 
experiments or hipothetical projections, the point being to generate 
imaginative thinking about options and constraints, and to work through 
the implications of plausible assumptions. For all their emphasis upon 
imagination rather than measurement or calculation, scenarios usually 
embody Some kind of self-consistency principles as a means of control; 
otherwise the comparison of projections under different assumptions 
would not be possible. Sometimes these principles may involve a formal 
model, even if only an accounting model to add up the cumulative effects 
(e.g., of primary energy output) resulting from basic assumptions (e.g.. 
about different resources, recovery rates, technological efficiencies, 
capacities, etc.). 
Whether scenarios are or could be an alternative to the problems of 
models is not a t  all clear. In the US CONAES energy policy study, for 
example. scenario construction was looked to  as a means of reconciling 
and synthesizing the conflicting models produced and used by different 
working groups within the study [50] .  Often scenarios are constructed 
with "plausible" upper and lower bounds of what are thought. to be key 
variables, in the hope that  "the real world will be captured within the 
band. In a sense this is a kind of crude attempt to specify an all-in sensi- 
tivity of the system of interest. 
In the IIASA energy study, as we shall see, scenarios were strongly 
ehphasized, and were lent plausibility by the use of formal models to 
check them. Precisely what scale and rigor this checking entailed, and 
what relationship the scenarios bore to the "robust" policy conclusions 
and "factual" bases for policy making that  the study then claimed, are a 
matter  of (disputed) interpretation. A serious problem is that the 
apparent plausibility of a scenario may allow the analysis to leap ahead 
to the fofmulation of a .further analytical problem for policy, which, in 
order to be taken seriously, necessarily presumes that  the scenario is 
not merely a thought experiment, but in some way captures the key 
parts of reality. What begin as  hypotheses often end up as certainties 
without even being properly tested. Thus uncertainties and questions a t  
this earlier level of scenario construction may be inadvertently left 
behind ,and neglected as the analysis (and policy making if i t  is not care- 
ful) plunges prematurely ahead into a whole round of flimsily conceived 
secondary problems and questions. 
Goldman's account of formal models as only the tip of a murky pol- 
icy analytical iceberg, cautioned: 
"Another chunk of the iceberg involves scenario formulation. 
Policy problems, in d u o ,  do not generally arise nicely formu- 
lated in terms of particular settings for the parameters of a 
model. If I would like to influence what answers a model gives. 
let me be the one who formulates for that model the scenario 
describing the decision problem a t  hand. Grant me that 
privilege, and I can probably make that model dance to pretty 
well any tune that  is desired. 
But if the input channels to  the model are too well-guarded for 
any flimflammery there, then let me be the one who interprets 
the model's outputs for the user, reading the entrails through 
appropriately tinted lenses, applying "subjective adjustments" 
in what Freedman calls "the exercise of judgement through the 
back door," and standing well-poised to exploit what Arthus 
describes as the "contrast (of) rigidity of the fact with the plas- 
ticity of its interpretation." And this area, that  of the provisions 
for judgemental adjustment and communication and explica- 
tion of model results, is yet another piece of the iceberg that  
requires exploration if the  model's performance and merits in 
actual use as a decision-aid are to be well understood [59]. 
Scenario construction is thus catalogued as yet another arena for 
possible "flimflammery" alongside other subjective adjustments referred 
to earlier. As with modeling per s e ,  this does not justify the abandon- 
ment of scenario construction, but i t  is an authoritative expression of 
the need for r'igorous clarity as to how assumptions, models: calcula- 
tions, scenarios, "subjective adjustments", and inferences to policy con- 
clusions are demarcated. and how they relate to one another. 
I13  Models, Meganodels, and Model Sets 
Models are  central to  knowledge and communication. They entail 
some kind of attempt to  describe and interpret reality [60]. As Box has 
put it, "all models are wrong, but some are useful" [61]. However, most 
models are mental models private to  individuals or groups with shared 
values and meanings. As such they are partial, vague, shifting, largely 
implicit, and thus cannot be subjected to  external checking and evalua- 
tion. Informal models may act  as a valid basis for knowledge within given 
subcultures that share sufficient experiences and meanings ("values") so 
that the unspecified aspects, having taken-for-granted validity and 
authority, can stay tacit. This provides social solidarity and linguistic 
economy, yet with flexibility to  negotiate new meanings and values. 
Such "models" are more rooted in concrete social interaction and often 
have value just because of the  ambiguities they contain: they are less 
recognizable as  "models" than those used by science. In such a form 
they are not ready to ac t  as a valid basis for overall public knowledge, 
which should be accountable, tha t  is, specifiable and in principle repro- 
ducible by others. 
In the  socially differentiated settings typical of modern society, 
knowledge and language, along with their constituent models, have 
become increasingly explicit and elaborate, since no shared meanings 
and values can be assumed [62]. This formalization - explicating under- 
lying models in detail, thus  rendering them available for cross-checking 
- is supposed to reach its most extreme and authoritative form in scien- 
tific models. Science is in theory a kind of anti-culture, being sup- 
posedly motivated by and organized on pure skepticism and a refusal to  
share any belief until i t  has been independently corroborated by 
"nature" [63]. In the  ideology of modern society, therefore, science is 
taken to be the  only basis of overarching authority (in the faith of 
Eastern and Western blocs alike) not so much uniting, but rather  reveal- 
ing and imposing a superior, unified authority over the many subcul- 
tures and fragmented, par Oal rationalities tha t  make up society in gen- 
eral [64]. The claim t o  such authority is based upon the supposedly com- 
pletely accessible nature of scientific models. 
Usually a given model will be a submodel of a larger model! which in 
turn may be a submodel of a still larger model, and so on. At some point 
on :this escalating scale, the  "model" will naturally become less precise, 
and more informal and flexible. I t  will also usually become more 
speculative, more open to broad value biases, and less accountable. Con- 
versely, a t  some point on a diminishing scale, the submodel will become 
a trivial "calculation" such as a simple accounting scale. In the latter 
case a "model" may still be useful for checking the bare numerical con- 
sistency of multiple assumptions, e.g., that  national supply and demand 
projections must balance. But this must not be confused with v e r i f y i n g  
those assumptions - it only means thay are not false in one of several 
dimensions, measured against other unverified assumptions. This small 
scale of consistency was confused in the IIASA documentation with 
larger-scale consistency, implying that a real validation of the assump- 
tions had been achieved. 
In talking about models, therefore, especially if deriving authority 
from them, it is important to be clear about which model level within the 
nested set one is referring to. 
In order t o  be useful, valid, and to  serve as the basis of public 
authority. such models would be expected to lie between the two 
extremes of triviality and informality; in other words: 
(a) Models are expected to  calculate something from specified inputs in 
specified functions or algorithms representing the essential 
features of the part of reality in question. Both the inputs and func- 
tions can be specified hypothetically for testing, but normally the 
dolossal investment and time involved in constructing the func- 
tional specifications of models means that they are inflexible in 
their internal structure once created 
(b) Models should be designed so that  iteration takes place within the 
model through clearly defined algorithms, in order to  evaluate out- 
puts of substages in calculation (submodels) and to  revise relevant 
inputs to  obtain consistency. This should be a clearly defined, sys- 
tematic process. 
At a larger level, models should be located in a process where the out- 
puts of the calculations can be used to  evaluate and adapt the  inputs 
(and/or functions) for another "iteration" of the outputs against 
accepted criteria so as to re-evaluate the inputs. This is crucially dif- 
ferent from merely r e n n n i n g  a model. Iteration is a formal process a s  
outlined in Figure l(a). Re-running involves changing the  inputs 
[Io t o  11, . . . , C] without any clearly defined, controlling relationships 
between the output OO and I l  ( On-l and In ), see Figure l(b). This dis- 
tinction is vital when i t  comes t o  perceptions of consistency and credibil- 
i ty of outputs, as we see later. 
(a) Ireration 
FIGURE la Iteration: The model includes an endogenous iteration algorithm 
This built-in feedback mechanism updates and corrects Oi, to produce O,+l. 
Hence, after repeated iteration, the  "initial guess" O0 is transformed into the fi- 
nal output 0, (note that  the external assumptions (A) are  not altered in this 
process). This is the kind of iterative process suggested in the documentation of 
the IIASA energy models. 
(b) Re-Running 
11 -1 Model 01 
FIGURE lb Re-running: The first run of the model produces the output OoV which the  
user considers unsatisfactory. Therefore, the  user changes the  inputs (Il) and 
assumptions (Al) and then runs the  model again. Thus the  model is not itera- 
tive; rather, it is run repeatedly until the  user is satisfied with the output 0,. 
This is the  undocumented, informal procedure that  was actually used to pro- 
duce the  IIASA scenarios. 
Iteration is no more nor less than the (idealized) normal process of 
science, which is supposed to be intrinsically self-correcting 
through skeptical testing of its hypotheses. The corrective "algo- 
rithm" is goodness of fit with empirical obse1-vation if possible, and 
with accepted canons of theory and logic where not. In systems 
analysis this has enjoyed far less empirical reference, and has usu- 
ally been computerized due to the level of aggregation and complex- 
ity of the systems being "analyzed. Clearly specified iteration is a 
central and necessary component of any analysis that  claims the 
authority of science for its conclusions. Thus the pr ima facie credi- 
bility of an analysis is bound to be questionable if it does not show 
how its iterations can be reproduced. 
(c) The main parameters of a model must be subjected to sensitivity 
analysis (SA). This is especially important if (as is now usual for 
complex policy systems) a model is aiming not to predict future 
states, but rather to  identify key real-world parameters and 
dynamic relationships which will be either constraints, points of pol- 
icy leverage, or social options. This is another way of systematically 
checking the selection of input assumptions, since selection must 
inevitably take place, and is itself a reflection of social assumptions 
and values. A respectable scientific modeling effort will thus per- 
form and describe SAs in such a way as to allow others to reproduce 
them. This SA also allows evaluation of the robustness of outputs 
(or conclusions derived from them) to small changes in model 
parameters or inputs. If such outputs change wildly with small 
changes in an input parameter whose real-world value could easily 
vary within that range (or where the uncertainty as to its value is 
already of that range or more), then those outputs are pr ima facie 
not ones on which to make commitments. 
Thus, to summarize, a scientific model -- that  is, one claiming 
automatic public credibility as opposed to  normal bias and arbitrariness 
-- should calculate something from specifiable inputs and model func- 
tions; be corrected by clear and reproducible iterations; and be sub- 
jected to systematic, documented, and reproducible sensitivity analysis, 
in order to test those selected inputs and model features of the real 
world for their-validity and relevance. Although a model set is not used 
directly to derive policy options, but instead underpins scenarios which 
are so used, this does not mean that  the models are exempt from evalua- 
tion in these terms. If the models are found wanting, this does not mean 
that  the scenarios are of no use, but they naturally become a less credi- 
ble base for any policy pronouncement 
No scientific endeavors have ever fully achieved the standards out- 
lined above. Nevertheless, they rightly exist as an institutionalized 
heuristic or normative framework, to guide and evaluate analytical prac- 
tice. 
11.4 Fbrmal and Informal Modes of Authority 
Throughout the history of science, but more acutely since its vastly 
expanded public role after World War 11, there has been a tension in the 
way that  science has been portrayed to its public audiences, in order to  
gain authority. On the one hand, there has been the rationalist, formal- 
ized account of science in which supposedly all its determinants can be 
precisely defined (data, logic, experimental methods, observational cri- 
teria, calculation, evaluative criteria, etc.) so that  scientific lmowledge 
gains its authority by being thought to be utterly and completely acces- 
sible, and testable.  Even if everyone could not so test  every piece of 
knowledge, the public trust  that  others competent t o  do so are regularly 
doing just that,  has given this image of science a powerful role in its pub- 
lic authority [65]. One can see immediately how scientific computerized 
models would correspond with this ethos. 
However, there is another, opposing image of science and its mode 
of proper public authority that has coexisted with this rationalist image. 
This has fed upon the realization that  scientists cannot possibly give a 
complete and precise account of all the complex elements of scientific 
knowledge. In this view there are  inevitable tacit components to scien- 
tific practice and thought which make i t  akin to a craft skill [66]. Thus 
refined intuitions, judgments and faiths that  cannot fully be explained 
and objectively justified, are essential to science. For its authority with 
non-scientists, this image of science relies upon the  idea that  scientists 
alone have been initiated via long and arduous apprenticeships into the 
esoteric craft skills which differentiate their competence to  judge from 
that of nonexperts. This authority is ironically based upon inaccessibil- 
ity, but only to the extent that  the external audience (e.g., the public a t  
large, or political decision makers) trust the institutions concerned. 
This requires a pre-existing shared cultural context - a given authority 
system - like those enjoyed in the reign of other priesthoods, for that  is 
essentially the mechanism of this kind of authority. 
This image of science implies authoritarianism and has usually been 
cultivated by conservative regimes or advocates, whereas the rationalist 
"enlightenment" image has usually been associated with democratist 
programs [6?]. 
Both these ideal types are artificially purified images and can be 
regarded as a kind of rhetoric for public consumption, concealing and 
giving informal license or authority to the much messier activities and 
outputs of science that  they are supposed to be describing. They are in a 
sense alternative authority rituals. Each style of self-representation has 
its own benefits, but also its own disciplines and intrinsic controls 
against absolute unlimited authority. The rationalist image requirds 
some r e d  accessibility and accountability to buttress the public rhe- 
toric; and the priesthood image requires some given authority structure 
and a previous track-record of effective craft skill and trustworthiness. 
As we shall see, the IIASA study is deeply muddled over its own 
nature: the result is to make it look as if it is trying to reap the benefits, 
yet avoid the disciplines, of both kinds of public self-representation. This 
is particularly important because of the naturally debatable social 
assumptions locked into and obscured by the "factual" definition of the 
analysis. 
111.1 l h e  Logic of JlLstification 
The I M A  study clearly draws upon scientific claims for i ts public 
authority. A typical claim is that:  
"over the  years more than 140 scientists from more than 20 
nations, East, West, and South alike, have for longer or briefer 
periods joined the  programme. ... Amor;y Lovins ... and others 
have participated in the  study. An explicit a t tempt  was made to  
incorporate as  many views and to be a s  objective as possible. 
The idea was to understand the  factual basis of t he  energy prob- 
lem ... it was not the  intent to go into the  political or societal 
aspects"~6B]. 
However, there  are  no acknowledgments here tha t  "many views" such as  
that  of Lovins were not  only not  "incorporated", but  indeed have engen- 
dered mutual  condemnation over the study [69] 
In order to  see how the  IlASA models relate  to this outdated fact- 
politics division we need to analyze the  relationships between several 
levels of work involved in the overall study: 
The logic of justification is a s  follows: 
1. There w i l l  be a fac tual  approach,  e zc lud ing  all  social a n d p o l i t i c a l  
fac tor s .  
2. However ,  orthodox pred ic t i on  is o u t ,  because  of "the unauoidabte 
uncer ta in t ies"  [EIFW, p.4251 therefore  s cenar ios  will be w r i t t e n .  
#These will aid t h e  rigorous identification of t h e  main real world vari- 
ables and relationships so as  to  define policy-specific options and  
constraints.  
"Together, t h e  scenarios and  the  sensitivity analyses 
should build both a broad enough understanding of the  
vital characteristics of the  energy problem and a set  of suf- 
ficiently specific facts so tha t  conclusions and 










































































































